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Abstract 
This paper examines whether there is spatial integration between and within paddy 
markets in the North and South of Vietnam. The empirical model developed uses esti-
mates of transfer costs to generalize Ravallion’s model of spatial market integration 
to allow for threshold effects. A sequential testing strategy is used to test for market 
segmentation, the number of thresholds, long-run integration, in-formational effi-
ciency, and the ‘Law’ of One Price within an error-correction frame-work. We find 
no threshold effects and weak evidence of paddy market integration between northern 
and southern Vietnam. There is, however, evidence of both threshold effects and 
stronger market integration within the Red and Mekong River deltas. Whenever price 
spreads exceeds their thresholds at least 60 percent of price changes are transmitted 
between regional markets within a month. None-the-less, the instantaneous version of 
the ‘Law’ of One Price only holds for a few regimes and market pairs.  
 
These results suggest that national level policies cannot be relied upon to stabilize or 
support paddy prices in Vietnam.  Instead, policies need to be designed with the spe-
cific production, consumption and marketing characteristics of northern and southern 
Vietnam in mind. 
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1. Introduction 
With its increasing integration into the world economy, Vietnam’s agricultural ex-
ports have grown substantially in recent years. From being a net importer of rice in 
the late 1980s, by the late 1990s Vietnam had become one of the largest rice ex-
porting countries. Paddy production has grown from 23 million metric tons in 1993 to 
36 million metric tons in 2005, with 70 percent of total paddy output coming from the 
Red River and Mekong River deltas. 
 
At the sub–national level, there are concerns that not all regions and categories of ag-
ricultural producers have and will benefit from the liberalization of Vietnam’s agri-
cultural markets. There are two distinct aspects to these concerns. First, if domestic 
markets are not spatially integrated, not all regions will benefit from market and trade 
liberalization to the same extent. Second, even if domestic markets are integrated in 
the long term, lack of integration in the short-term may mean that price changes are 
not transmitted between consumption centres and production areas quickly enough. If 
this is the case, agricultural market liberalization may disproportionately benefit trad-
ers and agricultural processors rather than agricultural producers and consumers. 
 
Accordingly, this study aims to answer three interrelated questions. First, is there is 
spatial integration between paddy markets in the North and South of Vietnam? The 
elongated geography of Vietnam results in high transfer costs for food market transac-
tions between the northern and the southern regions. Second, is there spatial integra-
tion in paddy markets within the North and within the South? We focus on paddy 
prices in the Red River Delta in the North and the Mekong River Delta in the South, 
both because they produce over two-thirds of national paddy output and because the 
price data for these regions is fairly comprehensive and complete. Finally, a third 
question to ask is if within-region integration is stronger and faster than between-
region integration. 
 
Section 2 provides an overview of paddy production, consumption and marketing in 
Vietnam from the 1990s to 2005 together with the key economic reforms that have 
occurred during this period. Section 3 describes our modelling and testing strategy, 
emphasizing the importance of thresholds in the presence of transfer costs. A thresh-
old error correction model is proposed to sequentially test for different forms of mar-
ket integration. Section 4 describes the monthly paddy price data used and how we 
have estimated transfer costs. Section 5 contains our empirical results. We find no 
threshold effects and weak evidence of paddy market integration between northern 
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and southern Vietnam. There is, however, evidence of both threshold effects and 
stronger market integration within each region. Section 6 offers some concluding re-
marks and policy recommendations.  
 
 
Source: GS0 (2006). 
2. Paddy Production, Consumption, Marketing and the 
Changing Policy Environment 
About two thirds of Vietnamese farm households grow paddy to serve the high do-
mestic demand for rice, exclusive of exporting requirement. Roughly 53 percent of 
Vietnam’s agricultural land area, which is approximately 4 million hectares, is de-
voted to the growing of paddy (Minot and Golleti, 1999; FAOSTAT, 2006). Ben-
jamin and Brandt (2004) summarize the state of Vietnamese paddy production as: 
“Rice production in Viet Nam is characterized by small irrigated farms, multiple 
cropping, labour intensive practices, and growing use of inorganic fertilizer, though 
there are substantial regional differences”. Although the planted area of paddy in-
creased from 7357 to 7444 thousand hectares, its share of total planted area has been 
declining (Table 1). 
 
The seasons for paddy growing vary across regions. In the North, there are generally 
two paddy crops annually: the Winter-Spring and Summer-Autumn crops. In irrigated 
areas in the South, there are usually three paddy crops per year: the Summer-Autumn, 
Autumn-Winter and Winter-Spring crops (Minot and Golleti, 1999; Luu, 2003). In 
rainfed areas in the South, only a wet-season crop is produced in the Autumn-Winter.  
Table 1. Planted land of paddy (thousand hectares) 
 
Year Agricultural land Arable land
Planted area 
of cereal
Planted area 
of paddy
(4) as percentage 
of (3)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 
1993 7087 5516 7058 6559 92.93
1994 7140 5464 7136 6599 92.47
1995 7079 5403 7324 6766 92.37
1996 7682 5554 7621 7004 91.91
1997 7844 5668 7768 7100 91.39
1998 8055 5763 8016 7363 91.85
1999 8413 6000 8349 7654 91.68
2000 8780 6200 8399 7666 91.28
2001 9483 6649 8225 7493 91.10
2002 9455 6600 8323 7504 90.17
2003 9622 6680 8367 7452 89.07
2004 n.a n.a 8438 7445 88.24
2005 (prel.) n.a n.a 8371 7326 87.52
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Figure 1. Paddy production by season in 1995-2005 
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Source: GSO (2006). 
Note: Figures for 2005 are preliminary 
 
 
By producing three crops staggered across the year, Vietnamese farmers can supply 
paddy to the market almost continuously through-out the year. Nationally, the Winter-
Spring crop accounts for just below one-half of paddy production while the Summer-
Autumn and Autumn-Winter crops each ac-count for just over one-quarter (Figure 1). 
 
There are a wide range of paddy varieties grown in Vietnam, but modern high yield-
ing varieties dominate production in irrigated areas and are also widely used for the 
wet-season crop in rainfed areas.  The percentage of paddy area planted to modern 
varieties increased from 47.5% in 1990 to almost 90% in 2000 (Tran, 2002).  Adop-
tion rates are believed to now exceed 95% (Centre for Agricultural Policy, 2007).  
Use of modern varieties is slightly higher in the North than the South of Vietnam.  
Traders usually classify paddy production into two grades: lua dai (long grain or C1) 
and lua tron (medium short grain or C2), which is also know as ordinary paddy (Luu, 
2003).  In this paper, we focus on the more widely traded ordinary grade of paddy. 
 
The period since the early 1990s had been one of dramatic but gradual economic 
change in Vietnam.  Since the introduction of the Doi moi (economic renovation) re-
forms in late 1986, Vietnam has been gradually moving to a market-oriented econ-
omy. Key changes that have affected the agricultural sector in general, and paddy 
producers and markets in particular, include: 
 
•  The extension of land use rights to most farmers through Resolution 5 of 1988 
and the Land Laws 1993 and 2003. By guaranteed paddy farmers’ tenure for 
20 or more years for annual crop land giving them the right to exchange, trans-
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fer, lease, inherit and mortgage their land, these land reforms have improved 
incentives for cultivation (Minot and Goletti, 1999); 
• The liberalization of rice and fertilizer marketing starting with the reduction of 
tariff on rice export from ten to one percent in 1991. This was followed by ex-
tension of authority to import fertilizer from central to provincial State-Owned 
Enterprises, the gradual lifting of the rice export quota, from less than 1 mil-
lion ton in 1992 to 4.5 million tons in 1998, the loosening of internal barriers 
to trading rice between Northern and South in 1997, and the abolition of quo-
tas on rice export and fertilizer import in 2001 (Benjamin and Brandt, 2004).  
• The declaration of a Water Law in 1999, which established a system of li-
censes and permits to allocate water, followed by the founding of a National 
Water Resources Council and basin-level committees was set-up to manage 
and allocate water in the Red River Delta, Mekong River Delta and other ar-
eas. These reforms to the water system facilitated the intensification of crop-
ping from one to two or three paddy crops per year (Barker, et al., 2004). 
 
In addition, a gradual improvement of road and market infrastructure has generally 
improved the trading environment.  Such changes have not, however, necessarily lead 
to a reduction in transfer costs, as freight rates are controlled by the State Pricing 
Committee and have remained stable in nominal terms since 1997.1 In addition, our 
interviews with traders and transporters (see Section 4) indicate that savings in vehi-
cle operating costs, due to the gradual improvement of the road system, have been 
largely offset by higher road and bridge tolls plus charges on trucks entering large 
municipal areas. 
 
Vietnam’s paddy production has been rising continuously during 1995-2005 with an 
average annual growth rate of 3.7 percent (Figure 2). In addition to the enhanced in-
centives provided by the market liberalization measures described above, this growth 
is attributed to an increase of 2.9 percent in yield of paddy (productivity) and the 
weak expansion of planted areas devoted to paddy, at the rate of about 0.8 percent per 
annum (Minot and Goletti, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  See State Pricing Committee Decision 36 of 1997 and Decision 89 of 2000. 
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Figure 2. Paddy production by region, 1995-2005 
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Source: GSO (2006). 
Note: Figures for 2005 are preliminary 
 
 
Vietnam has two main granaries: the Mekong River Delta in the South and the Red 
River Delta in the North. These two deltas, which account for 42.5 percent of the 
population, supply rice to the remaining five regions. The Mekong River Delta, the 
so-called “rice bowl of Vietnam”, supply more than a half (52 percent) of national 
paddy output, followed by the Red River Delta that produces around 20 per-cent of 
the total. None of the other five regions individually accounts for more than 9 percent 
of national paddy production.  
 
Rice is the main staple in the Vietnamese diet. About 83 percent of total annual paddy 
production is consumed domestically while the other 17 percent is exported. FAO 
Balance Sheets indicates that the main portion of domestic consumption (about 84 
percent) is used for food, with the remaining 16 percent accounted for by waste, seed 
and feed. Since the mid 1990s, Vietnam has become a major rice exporting country, 
with the volume of rice exports rising from 2 million tons in 1995 to 5.3 million tons 
in 2005 (Figure 3). In terms of volumes, Vietnam is now the second largest rice ex-
porter in the world after Thailand. However, in terms of value, Vietnam’s rice exports 
rank fourth or fifth in the world market due to the low quality of its rice exports and 
the limited value-added to paddy. 
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Figure 3. Vietnam’s export of rice in paddy equivalent 
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Before sale to consumers as milled rice, paddy goes through a process that involves 
many stages, including checking and sorting, drying and storing, milling, polishing 
and packaging, storage and transportation (Luu, 2003).  There are various channels 
used for marketing paddy and rice in Vietnam (Figure 4).  According to Minot and 
Goletti (1999), more than two-thirds of paddy is sold to the assemblers, of whom 95 
percent are private firms. Most of the remainder goes to small-scale millers for farm-
ers’ home consumption, while a small share is bought directly by larger millers. The 
assemblers then either have the paddy custom milled or sell paddy to medium and 
large-scale millers. Most mills are located with 30 kilometre radius of the production 
areas in which these assemblers operate (Luu, 2003).  The assemblers and millers sell 
the milled rice on to the wholesalers and retailers. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
play a relatively minor role in the within province marketing of paddy and rice but 
control the long-distance trade and the rice export market. SOEs consist of provincial 
and regional food companies (of which Vinafood I in the North, and Vinafood II in 
the South are the most important). 
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Figure 4. Vietnam's paddy and rice marketing channels 
  
Source: Drawn by the authors, based on Luu (2003) and Minot and Golletti (1999) 
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3. Modelling and Testing for Market Integration with 
Transfer Costs  
Tests of spatial market integration using time series data on food prices date back to 
the 1960s.2 The first tests arose from Lele’s (1967) and Jones’ (1968) analyses of sta-
ple food prices in India and Nigeria, respectively. The two authors estimated the con-
temporaneous correlations between price series in two markets in different locations. 
When the correlations were greater than 0.7 or 0.8, they concluded that price move-
ments were close enough for the two markets to be considered as being spatially inte-
grated. The cut-off point used for deciding if markets were spatially integrated was, 
however, arbitrary and no consideration was given to whether or not the price series 
were stationary or non-stationary. Nonetheless, many of the subsequent econometric 
models used for testing spatial market integration rely on the same idea of testing how 
closely prices move together. In particular, models of the Law of One Price (Isard, 
1977; Richardson, 1978) and the Ravallion model (Ravallion, 1986) are both exten-
sions of the correlation idea. Cointegration tests have also been used to test for the co-
movement of food prices and long-run market integration (Alexander and Wyeth, 
1991; Dawson and Dey, 2002). 
 
A growing body of the spatial market integration literature stresses the importance of 
transfer costs. Basically, transfer costs introduce a wedge between prices at separate 
locations, resulting in a non-linear relationship between such pairs of prices. The par-
ity bounds model developed by Sexton, Kling and Carman (1991) and Baulch (1997) 
explicitly take account of the non-linear price relationship in spatially distributed 
markets that is caused by transfer costs. Furthermore, much recent research focuses 
on an explicit modelling of threshold effects when testing the Law of One Price. See, 
for example, Goodwin and Piggott (2001), Meyer (2004), and Sarno, Taylor and 
Chowdhury (2004).3 
 
Transfer costs are important for modelling spatial market integration as they imply a 
potential bias in estimators based on linear models. Consider, for example, a re-
lationship between two paddy markets, i and j. In the absence of transfer costs, spatial 
market integration will imply that the paddy prices in the two markets should be 
equal, so pi = pj. In Figure 5 such a market integration situation is illustrated by the 
45-degree line. Now, if there are transfer costs of tc per kilogram of paddy, there need 
                                                 
2 See Fackler and Goodwin (2001) for an excellent review of these and other spatial price analysis 
methods. 
3 See Hansen (1996, 1997) for a general estimation procedure for threshold models. 
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not be any trade between the markets when pj – tc < pi < pj + tc because the transfer 
costs make inter-market trade unprofitable. This “no trade” region suggests that prices 
respond differently in the three regimes defined by the upper and lower thresholds, pj 
+ tc, pj – tc. If pi is above pj + tc (for example, point A in Figure 5) one would expect 
a trade flow from market j to market i, leading to a price increase in market j and a 
price decrease in market i. Likewise, if pi is less that pj – tc (for example, point B in 
Figure 5) trade between the markets should lead to a price decrease in market j and a 
price increase in market i. However, prices will only adjust when trade is profitable. 
When pi is between the pj – tc and pj + tc lines in Figure 5 (for example, point C), 
there is no trade inducing market forces to equate the paddy prices in the two markets. 
We describe this as the no-trade regime. It follows that the overall correlation be-
tween the prices may be low if prices are often in this no-trade regime. 
 
Figure 5. Prices in two markets with transfer costs 
 
 
 
In this paper we use outside information on transfer costs to formulate a threshold 
variation of Ravallion’s well-known dynamic model of spatial market integration 
(Ravallion, 1986). Specifically, we use fixed and known threshold values computed 
from additional information (collected from traders and transporters) about transfer 
pi 
pj 
pj + tc 
pi = pj 
pj - tc 
A 
B 
C 
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costs to model the three regimes described above. The remainder of this section 
shows how the model is formulated and presents the testing sequence we use to ana-
lyze the various forms of spatial market integration. 
 
Consider Ravallion’s model of market integration in which price in market i (pit) is 
conditional on the price in market j (pjt), lagged prices (pit-k and pjt-k) and a set of sea-
sonal dummies (St):4 
1 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 2 ' .φ ε− − − −= + + + + + + +it it it jt jt jt t tp d a p a p b p b p b p S          (1) 
We generalize this model by allowing the constant, the autoregressive parameters and 
the distributed lag parameters to vary across regimes in the following way: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 2 ' ,φ ε− − − −= + + + + + + +s s s s s sit it it jt jt jt t tp d a p a p b p b p b p S    (2) 
in which ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 0 1 2( , , , , , )θ =s s s s s s sd a a b b b are regime dependent parameters defined 
by 
(1)
1
( ) (0)
2 1
(2)
2
if ( )
if ( )
if ( )
θ
θ θ
θ
− −
− −
− −
⎧ − ≥⎪= < − <⎨⎪ ≤ −⎩
it l jt l
s
it l jt l
it l jt l
p p tc
tc p p tc
tc p p
                            (3) 
where the relationship between the inter-market price spread at lag l and the transfer 
costs (tc1, tc2) determines the regime. We refer to the ‘middle’ regime (θ (0)) as the no-
trade regime, while the two ‘outer’ regimes are denoted the above threshold re-
gime (θ (1)) and the below threshold regime (θ (2)), respectively. 
 
For simplicity, we assume the additive seasonal component in the price series is the 
same in all three regimes, and also that the innovations are iid(0,σ2) across the re-
gimes. The assumption of regime independent seasonal components is made to pre-
serve degrees of freedom as regime dependent seasonal components would add an-
other 22 parameters to the model. The assumption of iid(0,σ2) innovations is made to 
simplify the estimation procedure. With a constant variance across the regimes the 
                                                 
4 An autoregressive, distributed lag model with two lags appears to give a good description of the 
paddy price series in the subsequent analysis. Therefore, we present the model with two lags rather 
than a more general model having, say, k lags. 
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model can be estimated using ordinary least squares rather than generalized least 
squares.5 
 
The model in (2) can be reformulated as an error correction model allowing for non-
stationary and cointegrated prices in the two markets 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1 2 1 1 1( ) ' ,γ δ δ α β µ φ ε− − − −∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + − − + +s s s s s st jt it jt it jt t tp p p p p p S           (4) 
and the parameters in (2) and (4) are related by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 1 2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2
1 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
, ,
(1 ), , .
1 1
γ δ δ
α β µ
= = − = −
+ += − − − = =− − − −
s s s s s s
s s s s
s s s s s
s s s s
b a b
b b b da a
a a a a
      (5) 
The error correction term in (4) is a “generalized” inter-market price spread 
( ) ( )β µ= − −s st it jtw p p , which simplifies to the standard inter-market price spread 
when β(s) = 1. 
 
The threshold error correction in equation (4) can be used to test most of the interest-
ing hypotheses about spatial market integration including the Law of One Price and 
Ravallion’s tests for market segmentation and long-run market integration.6  The first 
hypothesis to be tested is one of market segmentation. Based on Ravallion (1986), we 
define market segmentation as a model in which the price in market j does not 
Granger-cause the price in market i and, in addition, that there is no instantaneous 
correlation between the price series—in any regime. Hence, in terms of parameter re-
strictions we say that the markets are segmented if in equation (4): 
  
(1) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 2: 0, 0, 0, for all 0,1,2.α δ γ= = = =s s sH s                                    (6) 
 
If market segmentation is rejected, we next test for the number of thresholds. This is 
done in three steps. Specifically, we formulate and test the three hypotheses 
(2 ) (1) (0) (2 ) (2) (0) (2 ) (1) (2) (0)
0 0 0: , : , : .θ θ θ θ θ θ θ= = = =a b cH H H               (7) 
                                                 
5 These simplifying assumptions are made with a view to the empirical models. In the Appendix we 
show that the error variance is indeed constant across regimes in our estimated models and, further, 
that the additive seasonal components are not significantly different across regimes. 
6 To ensure valid inference we also test for stationarity of the individual price series. 
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If the first two hypotheses are rejected we infer that there are two thresholds. In con-
trast, if all three hypotheses are accepted we infer that the model is linear. 
 
Once the number of thresholds is established, we can further reformulate the error 
correction model to allow for freely varying long-run parameters in each regime 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2 1 1 1 ' .γ δ δ α π φ ε− − − −∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + + + +s s s s s sit jt it jt it jt t tp p p p p p d S  (8) 
 
Subsequently, we test for long-run market integration, which is the hypothesis 
 
(3) ( ) ( )
0 :
s sH α π= −                                         (9) 
 
in equation (8). This is equivalent to testing β(s) = 1 in equation (4). Clearly, the num-
ber of hypotheses tested depends on the number of thresholds, so our tests for long-
run market integration are regime dependent. Note that with two thresholds, the in-
formation about the long run parameters may be weak in particular in the no-trade re-
gime.7  
 
If long run integration is accepted in a regime, we impose the restriction by using the 
lagged inter-market price spread as the error correction term (i.e., ( ) ( )1 1
s s
it jtp pα π− −+  
is replaced by ( ) 1 1( )
s
it jtp pα − −− in equation(8)). If long-run market integration is re-
jected it makes little sense to carry on testing stronger versions of the Law of One 
Price. Hence, the following hypotheses and tests are only reported if the hypothesis of 
long-run market integration is accepted in at least one regime. 
  
Before testing for the strong version of the Law of One Price we look at a weaker re-
striction, which is akin to the weak market efficiency hypothesis in the financial mar-
kets literature. This is done by formulating a hypothesis of common dynamics. We de-
fine common dynamics to be the restriction 
(4) ( ) ( )
0 1 2:
s sH δ δ= −                                            (10) 
If the hypothesis is accepted, the only past information needed to predict the price in 
market i is the inter-market price spread in previous periods. Adding information on 
                                                 
7 The term ‘long-run market integration’ may be somewhat misleading in this model as acceptance 
of the hypothesis in some regimes does not imply that prices will eventually be equal in the absence 
of shocks. However, if the hypothesis is accepted in all regimes, then the standard notion of long-
run market integration applies. 
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past values of individual prices will not improve the prediction of the price in market 
i. 
 
Finally, given acceptance of long-run market integration and common dynamics it is 
interesting to test for the strong version of the Law of One Price. The hypothesis is 
formulated as 
(5) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 1 2: 1 and .
s s sH γ δ δ= = −                                (11) 
This involves testing jointly that the prices in the two markets have common dynam-
ics and that the conditional correlation between the two prices is one. In this case, a 
unit change in prices in market j will be associated with a one unit change in prices in 
market i within the current time period. This is similar to Ravallion’s (1986) test for 
short-run market integration (strong form) and implies that the Law of One Price 
holds contemporaneously.8 
4. Data 
The paddy price data were provided by the Information Center for Agriculture and 
Rural Development (ICARD).9 Prices of paddy (and some other agricultural com-
modities) are collected on Fridays at public markets in sixteen provinces. Based on 
the weekly data, monthly price series are computed by taking averages. It is worth 
considering the appropriateness of using monthly series in testing spatial market inte-
gration. Luu (2003) argues that average monthly data are inappropriate when analyz-
ing rice market integration in the Mekong River Delta because these prices do not re-
flect the daily prices on which traders make their arbitrage decisions. However, the 
weekly price series have several long periods in which prices are constant in almost 
every market. Such constancy of prices will invalidate a statistical analysis which is 
based on an assumption of independent and identically distributed innovations that 
follow a continuous distribution. Moreover, the use of weekly data is problematic due 
to the need to interpolate numerous missing values. For these reasons we have chosen 
to analyze the monthly data instead of the weekly data. However, since contempora-
neous prices cannot be used both to distinguish regimes and as a dependent variable, 
                                                 
8 If the Law of One Price is not rejected in a regime, the model for that regime reduces to 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1
( ) ( ) ,s s s
t t t t t t t t
p p p p p p Sδ α µ φ ε− − − −∆ = ∆ + ∆ − + − − + +  and this implies that the loading pa-
rameter α(s) is no longer of “special interest” for describing the dynamics of price adjustment. 
9 See http://www.agroviet.gov.vn. 
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we construct the regime indicators using prices lagged by half a month.10  This lag 
corresponds to the time it typically takes traders to make inter-provincial shipments. 
 
For paddy prices, we have complete monthly data across eight markets from January, 
1993 to May, 2006. Four out of the eight markets are located in the Red River Delta 
(Ha Noi, Bac Ninh, Nam Dinh, and Thai Binh). The other four markets are located in 
the Mekong River Delta (Can Tho, An Giang, Tien Giang, and Ca Mau). As can be 
seen in Figure 6, all these provinces cluster round the 1A National Road, which is the 
main road connecting the North, Centre and South of Vietnam. National roads also 
connect Ha Noi with Bac Ninh, Nam Dinh and Thai Binh and Can Tho with An 
Giang and Tien Giang. Given the fact that inflation has changed substantially over the 
period, we adjust for its effects by deflating nominal paddy prices using the Consumer 
Price Index into constant January 1993 prices. 
 
In addition to price series, we also need estimates of transfer costs to determine the 
thresholds used in the estimation of the threshold error correction model defined by 
equations (4) and (8). Transfer costs represent the total observed costs of moving 
paddy from one market to another, and include both fixed costs and variable costs 
elements. Data on these fixed and variable costs were collected through interviews 
with traders and lorry drivers in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City during the summer of 
2006.11 The fixed cost element comprises loading and unloading costs plus specific 
trade taxes (where applicable). The variable cost element comprises pure freight 
costs, which vary with the distance travelled and road conditions, and ad valorem 
trade taxes. From our interviews with traders, we have estimated the unit cost of 
transporting one kilogram of paddy over one kilometre. We assume that these unit 
costs are constant in real terms and do not vary according to the distance between 
markets.12 So to estimate the transportation costs between two markets, we multiply 
the unit costs of transportation by the distance between markets. Finally, since it is 
rice rather than paddy which is usually transported between provincial markets, we 
also adjust transfer costs by the milling ratio between paddy and rice. 
                                                 
10 We do this by taking an average of the inter-market price spreads at time t and t-1. i.e., 
1 2 1 1 2 1
( ) (1 )( )
t t t t
p p p pλ λ − −− + − −  where λ = 0.5.  Setting λ equal to 0.25 or 0.75 produces similar re-
sults. 
11 Our interviews with traders indicate that, due to the transshipment costs involved, very little 
paddy or rice is transported between provinces using rail or water in Vietnam. 
12 In theory, unit transportation costs should decline with distance travelled. However, our inter-
views with traders and transporters indicate that this is a very imprecise relationship with freight 
rates often remaining constant between nearby markets. 
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Figure 6. Location and Transportation Links between the eight Paddy Markets 
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Accordingly, our estimates of transfer costs between markets i and j (tcij) are based on 
the following expression: 
(20 0.45 ) / 0.65= + ×ij ijtc D   (12) 
where 20 (Dong) is the fixed cost of loading and unloading one kilogram of rice, 0.45 
(Dong) is the unit cost of transporting 1 kilogram of paddy for 1 kilometer, Dij 
is the 
distance following the main road between market i and market j and 0.65 is the mill-
ing (rice-paddy conversion) ratio.13 
 
Table 2. Estimated Transfer Costs Between Market Pairs 
 
Market 1 Market 2 Distance (km) Estimated Transfer Cost
 
Ha Noi Bac Ninh 25 23
Ha Noi Nam Dinh 85 43
Ha Noi Thai Binh 95 46
Ha Noi Can Tho 1794 606
Can Tho Ha Noi 1794 758
Can Tho An Giang 65 36
Can Tho Tien Giang 115 53
Can Tho Ca Mau 213 85
 
Notes: The transfer costs are measured in Dong per kg in January 1993 prices. 
 
Table 2 presents our estimated transfer costs between the market pairs in our analysis. 
To be consistent with the paddy price series, we have deflated our transfer cost esti-
mates to constant January 1993 terms. Within each region (North or South), transfer 
costs from the main markets in the producing areas to Hanoi and Can Tho account for 
three to four percent (i.e., VND 36 to 46 per kilogramme) of the median paddy price. 
We assume that, within regions, transfer costs from market i to market j is the same as 
from market j to market i. However, our discussions with traders suggest that this as-
sumption does not hold between markets in the North and South of Vietnam, since the 
demand for moving goods from the South to the North is substantially higher than in 
the opposite direction. Our discussions with traders indicate that the premium on 
moving produce from the South to the North is approximately 25 percent, so this is 
added to our estimates of transfer costs between Can Tho and Ha Noi.  Once this 
premium is included, transfer costs between Can Tho and Hanoi account for VND 
758 per kilogramme, or almost 70% of the median paddy price in Can Tho─implying 
that paddy price levels in the South and North need to differ substantially before it is 
profitable to ship rice between these regions. 
                                                 
13  Note that unit cost of transportation calculated (0.45 kg/km) is very close to the freight rates pre-
scribed for national highways by Vietnam’s State Pricing Committee (0.435 kg/km) in 2000. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Paddy Prices 
 
Market Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
North 
Ha Noi 1348.89 1363.12 219.95 836.11 1934.56
Bac Ninh 1375.96 1350.53 232.18 1021.99 2063.53
Nam Dinh 1308.69 1302.00 222.92 935.51 1930.30
South 
Thai Binh 1286.03 1267.31 212.27 919.78 1862.91
Can Tho 1090.79 1093.13 137.32 765.33 1412.56
An Giang 1083.93 1083.61 155.86 716.89 1487.86
Tien Giang 1112.76 1112.13 149.78 755.10 1560.78
Ca Mau 1101.36 1106.82 166.43 729.56 1668.21
 
Notes: There are 161 observations in the sample (1993m1-2006m5). Prices are measured in terms of Dong 
per kg in January 1993 prices. 
 
 
Table 3 shows means, medians, and other basic statistics of the monthly price series. 
We note that, on average, prices in the Northern provinces are higher than those in the 
Southern provinces. Among the eight markets in our sample, An Giang and Can Tho 
have the lowest paddy prices. This low level of prices may well reflect that An Giang 
and Can Tho are the largest paddy producers in Vietnam. In contrast, the highest level 
of prices are in Bac Ninh and Ha Noi in the North. Note that the median prices in Ha 
Noi, the capital centre, are higher than in nearby Bac Ninh although the reverse is true 
for mean prices. 
 
We examine the time series properties of the prices by testing for stationarity using 
Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock’s (1996) modified Dickey-Fuller test.14 Table 4 reports 
the unit root test results using the ERS test with a trend as the dominating determinis-
tic component. The number of lags is chosen using the Schwarz information criterion. 
All price series in the northern markets have unit roots in levels but not in first differ-
ences, hence they are I(1). However, in the southern markets the price series from An 
Giang, and Tien Giang do not seem to have unit roots when tested at the 5 percent 
level of significance though they do have unit roots at the 1 percent level. The test sta-
tistic for Ca Mau lies on the boundary of accepting or rejecting the unit root at the 1 
percent level. Like the North, the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for the first 
differences of the prices in the South. In sum, we conclude that, all the price series are 
integrated of order 1. 
                                                 
14 This test follows the augmented Dickey-Fuller procedure, but has better power than the standard 
ADF-test in small samples (Baum and Sperling, 2001).  The ERS test is also known as the DFGLS 
test. 
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Table 4.  Unit-Root Tests 
  
 ------------- First differences ----------- ----------------- Levels ----------------- 
Market Optimal lag Test statistic Optimal lag Test statistic 
  
North   
Ha Noi 1 -10.31 2 -2.21 
Bac Ninh 1 -8.42 1 -2.34 
Nam Dinh 1 -8.91 1 -2.35 
Thai Binh 1 -8.97 1 -2.34 
South  
Can Tho 4 -3.06 2 -2.48 
An Giang 1 -10.13 1 -3.22 
Tien Giang 1 -9.75 1 -2.96 
Ca Mau 3 -3.32 1 -3.52 
 
Notes: The test for unit-roots is the Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) test with seasonal dummies included. 
The 1%, 5%, and 10% critical values for levels are -3.51, -2.91, and -2.63, respectively. The 1%, 5%, and 
10% critical values for first differences are -2.59, -2.04, and -1.72, respectively. 
5. Empirical Results 
In this Section, we apply the sequential approach to testing for market integration dis-
cussed in Section 3 to the eight non-stationary paddy price series described above in 
order to investigate: (i) whether paddy markets in the North and the South of Vietnam 
are spatially integrated, (ii) if paddy markets within the North and within the South 
are integrated, and (iii) if price adjustment within regions is stronger (and faster) than 
between them. 
 
To investigate whether paddy markets in the North and the South of Vietnam are spa-
tially integrated, we choose Ha Noi to represent the North and Can Tho to represent 
the South. Ha Noi, the capital city, is the second largest city in Vietnam and is located 
close to the centre of the Red River Delta. Can Tho is the major milling and exporting 
centre in the Mekong River Delta.15 Having tested if Ha Noi and Can Tho are spa-
tially integrated, we then move on to examining whether the other three markets in 
the North (Bac Ninh, Nam Dinh and Thai Binh) are spatially integrated with Ha Noi. 
Then we perform similar tests with Can Tho and the other three markets in the South 
(An Giang, Tien Giang and Ca Mau). Recall that only when market segmentation is 
rejected and long-run market integration is accepted, do we move on to testing for 
common dynamics and the Law of One Price.  
                                                 
15 Ho Chi Minh City, the major commercial centre and largest city in Vietnam, would have been an 
alternative choice for the major centre of demand in the South.  However, it is not located in the 
Mekong River Delta and the paddy price data available for Ho Chi Minh City are very incomplete. 
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Table 5. Tests for Market Integrations 
         
Market pairs 
# of 
thres-
holds Regime 
Regime 
Frequen-
cies 
Long-run 
Integra-
tion 
Common 
Dynamics
Law of 
One Price γ α 
   
Ha Noi - Can Tho 0   A R R 0.410 -0.149 
       (0.105) (0.040) 
North         
Ha Noi - Bac Ninh 1 Above+ 0.50 A A R 0.644 -1.181 
  No-trade     (0.073) (0.356) 
  Below 0.50 A A R 0.637 -0.606 
       (0.082) (0.096) 
Ha Noi - Nam Dinh 2 Above 0.42 A A R 0.600 -0.437 
       (0.084) (0.105) 
  No-trade 0.37 A A A 1  
       (-)  
  Below 0.21 A A A 1  
       (-)  
Ha Noi - Thai Binh 2 Above 0.54 A A R 0.495 -0.407 
       (0.073) (0.088) 
  No-trade 0.32 A A R 0.779 -1.394 
       (0.074) (0.151) 
  Below 0.14 A A A 1  
       (-)  
South         
Can Tho - An Giang 2 Above 0.27 A A R 0.733 -1.083 
       (0.073) (0.175) 
  No-trade 0.57 A A R 0.859 -1.357 
       (0.057) (0.117) 
  Below 0.16 A R R 0.868 -1.201 
       (0.010) (0.158) 
Can Tho - Tien Giang 2 Above 0.08 A A A 1  
       (-)  
  No-trade 0.62 A A R 0.798 -0.587 
       (0.062) (0.095) 
  Below 0.3 A A R 0.808 -0.947 
       (0.066) (0.172) 
Can Tho - Ca Mau 2 Above 0.06 A A R 0.452 -0.864 
       (0.200) (0.306) 
  No-trade 0.77 R     
   Below 0.17 R     
 
Notes: R and A indicate the null-hypotheses can be rejected and ‘accepted’ at the 5% level of significance. 
Standard errors of the estimated parameters γ and α are shown in round brackets. 
 
 
Table 5 summarizes the test results for all market pairs.16  Two thresholds are indi-
cated for all market pairs except for Ha Noi and Can Tho (where no thresholds are de-
tected) and between Ha Noi and Bac Ninh (where there is no statistical difference be-
                                                 
16 Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix provide diagnostic tests for our empirical models. In general, 
the models are well specified as we find no evidence of autocorrelation or regime dependent het-
eroskedasticity. In addition, as seen from Table A2, the final models have constant parameters, 
judged by the Nyblom-Hansen test for parameter instability. 
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tween the parameters in the no trade and above threshold regimes). Market segmenta-
tion is also strongly rejected for all market pairs, except for Can Tho and Ca Mau, 
implying that paddy prices in the demand centers are influenced by paddy prices in 
the markets in the producing areas.   
 
Figure 7. Cross Plot of Ha Noi and Can Tho and Time Series Plot of the Inter-
market Price Spread with Thresholds given by Estimated Transfer Costs 
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The finding of no thresholds for Ha Noi and Can Tho requires further comment, as 
these are the two most important demand centres in the Red River and Mekong River 
deltas. The absence of a threshold between these markets implies that there is a linear 
relationship between paddy prices in Ha Noi and Can Tho.  As can been seen from 
the time series plot of price differences on the right hand side of Figure 7, the inter-
market price spread only exceeds estimated transfer costs in 1 of our 161 observa-
tions. Under such circumstances one would not expect to observe a high correlation 
between paddy price changes in Ha Noi and Can Tho, and this is born out by the dis-
parate cross plot of prices on the left-hand side of Figure 7.  It is also reflected in the 
coefficient of 0.41 on contemporaneous price changes (γ) in Can Tho in the unre-
stricted linear error correction model.  Furthermore, the loading coefficient (α) on the 
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lagged inter-market price spread indicates that the speed of price adjustment between 
Ha Noi and Can Tho is rather slow. Put differently, transfer costs between Ha Noi and 
Can Tho (which are 1,790 kms apart) are sufficiently high to make trade between the 
two markets unprofitable virtually all of the time. We can therefore conclude that 
paddy markets in Ha Noi and Can Tho are only weakly integrated which, in turn, 
suggests there is low integration between paddy and rice markets in the North and 
South of Vietnam.17 
 
In contrast to Ha Noi and Can Tho, thresholds are indicated for all market pairs within 
the North and within the South of Vietnam. In general, we find two-threshold models, 
in accordance with the theory. However, for Ha Noi and Bac Ninh, the two geo-
graphically closest markets in our series we find no statistical significant difference 
between the parameters in the regime above the threshold (when the price in Ha Noi 
is greater than the price in Bac Ninh plus transfer costs) and the no-trade regime. This 
may reflect Bac Ninh’s role as satellite town to Hanoi, with millers and wholesalers 
shipping to either Hanoi or Bac Ninh but little paddy or rice being traded between the 
two markets. Hence for this market pair, a one threshold model is estimated with 
strong co-movement of prices indicated by the γ coefficients (of 0.644 and 0.637) in 
the two regimes. 
 
Given the results about the number of thresholds we move on to test the hypothesis of 
long-run market integration for each regime in turn. Long-run integration, which cor-
responds to a one-unit change in the price in one market eventually translating into a 
one-unit price change in the other market, occurs in all regimes in all markets in the 
North and in all regimes in two of the three markets in the South. The exception is the 
market pair Can Tho – Ca Mau for which long run integration is rejected both in the 
no-trade regime and in the below regime (when the paddy price in Ca Mau exceeds 
the paddy price in Can Tho plus the transfer costs). For these two markets, long run 
integration cannot be rejected in the upper regime, although the number of observa-
tions is very small in that regime, making us reluctant to draw strong conclusions for 
this test. 
 
Only when long-run market integration is indicated do we test for common dynamics 
and the Law of One Price using the restricted version of the threshold error correction 
model. Generally, for thresholds and market pairs for which long-run integration is 
                                                 
17 Recall that the price series used for these tests are for ordinary paddy, so there may still be trade 
in high quality (‘fancy’) rice between the South and North of Vietnam. 
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indicated, common dynamics are also found.18 The finding of a common dynamics 
shows that all necessary information for predicting the future price is contained in the 
inter-market price spread (weak-form market efficiency). 
 
The Law of One Price is, however, firmly rejected for most market pairs.19 This is not 
surprising as the form of the Law of One Price which is being tested requires that: (i) 
price changes in the two markets move together on a one-for-one basis within a single 
period and, (ii) that the common factor restriction also holds.  As can be seen from the 
last but one column of Table 5, the γ coefficients between contemporaneous prices 
changes for these regimes and market pairs are all between 0.41 and 0.87. This is in-
dicative of reasonably strong but far from one-for-one co-movement of paddy prices. 
For most market pairs, the γ coefficients exceed 0.6 when the inter-market price 
spread is above the upper or below the lower threshold.  From this we may conclude 
that, when prices between markets are above or below their threshold levels, at least 
60 percent of price changes are transmitted between markets within a month.   
 
The final column of Table 5 shows the loading coefficients (α) from the restricted er-
ror correction models. As expected, all the loading coefficients are negative showing 
that the inter-market price spreads will converge to their long-run equilibrium values. 
The absolute sizes of the coefficients indicate very rapid ‘corrections’ in some mar-
kets. In particular in the South we find that the inter-market price spreads returns to 
the no-trade regime within the following month. In addition, the absolute size of the 
loading coefficient is much smaller for Ha Noi and Can Tho than for market pairs 
within the North and within the South. This suggests that prices co-move more 
strongly when the threshold band is narrow. Put differently, when transfer costs do 
not prevent trade, spatial arbitrage brings price differentials back to their thresholds 
quickly.  This is confirmed by the time series plots in Figure 8, which shows fairly 
rapid reversion of the price spreads whenever spreads exceeds the transfer costs.  
 
                                                 
18 Here the exception is the lower regime in the Can Tho – An Giang market in which common dy-
namics is rejected with a p-value of 0.04.  
19 When the Law of One Price is not rejected it is often in regimes with a relatively low frequency, 
such as the lower regime in the Ha Noi – Thai Binh market and the upper regime in the Can Tho – 
Tien Giang market. However, we find the Law of One Price to hold in two regimes in the Ha Noi – 
Nam Dinh market suggesting a close integration of this market pair. 
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Taken together, our sequential tests for market integration show weak evidence of 
market integration between paddy markets in the North and South of Vietnam, but 
Figure 8. Time Series Plots of the Inter-market Price Spreads with Thresholds 
given by Es-timated Transfer Costs 
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stronger evidence of spatial market integration within the North and within the 
South.20 While there is evidence of thresholds and long-run integration for most mar-
ket pairs, the strict version of the Law of One Price does not hold in general even 
when the price difference between markets exceed the upper or lower thresholds. 
Nonetheless, when price spreads are above or below the relevant thresholds, a large 
fraction of the price changes are transmitted between paddy markets within a very 
short period of time. The extent and speed of price transmission is generally faster in 
paddy markets located in the South. 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
There has been very little research on food market integration in Vietnam. This paper 
aims to fill this gap by focusing on the spatial integration of paddy markets in the Red 
River and Mekong River deltas. The empirical model developed uses estimates of 
transfer costs to generalize the well-known Ravallion model to allow for the possibil-
ity of threshold effects. A sequential testing strategy is developed which progressively 
tests for market segmentation, the number of thresholds, long-run market integration, 
common dynamics and (the strict version of) the Law of One Price within an error-
correction framework. 
 
We find weak evidence of market integration between paddy markets in the North 
and South of Vietnam and an absence of threshold effects. However, there is evidence 
of both threshold effects and stronger forms of spatial market integration for paddy 
markets within the North and within the South.  Specifically, convergence towards the 
relevant thresholds and informational efficiency hold for most market pairs, with at 
least 60 percent of price changes being transmitted between markets within one 
month whenever price spreads exceeds their upper or lower thresholds. The extent 
and speed of price transmission within regional paddy markets is generally faster in 
the South than the North of Vietnam. However, the instantaneous version of the Law 
of One Price, which requires full price adjustment occur within a month, only holds 
for a few regimes and market pairs. 
 
                                                 
20 These results resonate with those of Moser, Barrett and Minten (2001) in Madagascar, who found 
little integration of rice markets at the national level─due to prohibitively high transport costs─ 
while rice markets at the sub-regional level were fairly well integrated.  Moser, Barrett and Minten’s 
conclusion that intra-seasonal trade reversals occurred in 63% of Malagasy communes is also simi-
lar to our finding of two-thresholds for most market pairs within North and South Vietnam.  Note 
that both Madagascar and Vietnam are geographically large and long countries. 
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The policy implications of these results are twofold. First, since there is limited evi-
dence of integration between paddy markets in the North and South of Vietnam, na-
tional level policies cannot be relied upon to stabilize or support paddy prices. In-
stead, the Government objectives of stabilizing and supporting farmgate paddy prices 
need to be designed and implemented with the specific production, consumption and 
marketing characteristics of northern and southern Vietnam in mind. In addition, as 
noted in Newberry and Stiglitz (1981) classic text, it is also essential that the benefits 
and costs of price stabilization are carefully assessed.  Second, since there is evidence 
of market integration within the Red River and Mekong River deltas, paddy markets 
within these regions can be relied upon to transmit price signals between deficit and 
surplus areas relatively well. Furthermore, since the speed and extent of price trans-
mission is relatively rapid within the North and within the South of Vietnam, the pri-
vate sector trade can be relied upon to transfer rice and paddy between markets in an 
efficient manner. If, however, large demand-supply imbalances were to emerge be-
tween the North and South, transfer costs are likely to prevent private-sector trade 
taking place and the public sector might need to intervene to ensure adequate supplies 
in the short-term. Such interventions would, however, need to be implemented in a 
consistent and market friendly way to avoid destabilizing and distorting an essentially 
well integrated and competitive paddy marketing system. 
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Appendix: Model Diagnostics 
In this Appendix we report some diagnostic test statistics for the market integration 
models. The main questions we address are the assumption of iid(0,σ 2) innovations 
across the regimes and the assumption of regime independent additive seasonal com-
ponents. In addition, we report tests of parameter constancy to give support to main 
test results in Table 5. The diagnostic tests are based on the model in equation (8) in 
which we impose long run integration when it is accepted (see Table 5). Hence, the 
estimated short run parameters, γ (s), δ1(s), δ 2(s), and α(s) are unrestricted in all regimes. 
 
Table A1 reports p-values of three test statistics for each of the markets within the 
Red River and Mekong River deltas. The first statistic is the Breuch-Goodfrey test of 
first-order autocorrelation in the innovations. (See e.g. Goodfrey, 1988). In general, 
the null-hypothesis of lack of first-order autocorrelation cannot be rejected although 
the hypothesis is marginally rejected at the 1% level of significance for the Ha Noi – 
Thai Binh market. 
 
The second statistic is the Breuch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity in the innovations, 
in which we use the version of the test that does not assume normality of the innova-
tions (i.e., we use TR2 where T is the number of observations and R2 is the un-centred 
R-squared from the auxiliary regression). We test specifically for differences in the 
innovation variance across the regimes and, as seen from Table A1, we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the innovation variance is constant, although the hypothesis is 
marginally rejected for the Ha Noi – Nam Dinh market. 
 
Based on the tests for autocorrelation and regime dependent heteroskedasticity, we do 
not find statistical evidence against the assumption of iid(0,σ 2)  innovations. 
 
Table A1. Model Diagnostics for the Six Local Markets 
    
 --------------------- North ------------------- ---------------------- South ---------------------- 
  
Ha Noi - 
Bac Ninh 
Ha Noi -
Nam Dinh
Ha Noi -
Thai Binh
Can Tho- An 
Giang
Can Tho - 
Tien Giang 
Can Tho - 
Ca Mau 
    
Autocorrelation 0.76 0.73 0.01 0.14 0.61 0.84 
Heteroskedasticity 0.13 0.02 0.57 0.16 0.28 0.16 
Common Seasonals 0.24 0.22 0.34 0.18 0.30 0.85 
 
Notes: The figures reported in the table are p-values 
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Tabel A2. Nyblom-Hansen Tests of parameter constancy 
  
   δ  δ 2 γ α σ 
 
Ha Noi – Can Tho 0.145 0.268 0.186 0.268 0.098 
North 
Ha Noi - Bach Ninh Above+Inside 0.142 0.124 0.049 0.126 0.217
 Below 0.098 0.158 0.101 0.344
 
Ha Noi - Nam Dinh Above 0.120 0.076 0.245 0.033
 Inside 0.048 0.034 0.236 0.052 0.592*
 Below 0.073 0.203 0.040 0.102
 
Ha Noi - Thai Binh Above 0.141 0.261 0.111 0.124
 Inside 0.121 0.046 0.067 0.260 0.309
 Below 0.067 0.086 0.075 0.034
 
South 
Can Tho - An Giang Above 0.105 0.046 0.126 0.181
 Inside 0.674* 0.192 0.250 0.161 0.113
 Below 0.033 0.091 0.055 0.083
 
Can Tho - Tien Giang Above 0.016 0.033 0.018 0.010
 Inside 0.459** 0.273 0.058 0.337 0.100
 Below 0.056 0.034 0.036 0.060
 
Can Tho - Ca Mau Above 0.088 0.022 0.049 0.052
 Inside 0.278 0.098 0.213 0.214 0.323
  Below 0.079 0.017 0.031 0.045  
 
Notes: * Significant at 5%; ** at 10%.  The critical values for the parameter stability tests are 0.748 (1%), 
0.470 (5%) and 0.353 (10%), see Hansen (1992). 
 
Next, we turn to the second auxiliary assumption: common seasonality across re-
gimes. This assumption is mainly imposed to preserve degrees of freedom and it is 
straight forward to augment the regression models to include regime specific additive 
seasonality. The last row in Table A1 reports tests of the joint significance of regime 
specific seasonal dummies. For all markets we find statistical support for the hypothe-
sis of common additive seasonal components.      
 
In Table A2 we report Nyblom-Hansen test statistics for parameter constancy (Ny-
blom, 1989; Hansen, 1992). The tests are Lagrange Multiplier statistics based on the 
null-hypothesis of constant parameters against the alternative that the parameters fol-
low a random walk. The limiting distribution of the test statistics is non-standard, but 
critical values are reported in Hansen (1992). Table A2 shows that we cannot reject 
the assumption of constant parameters: at the 5% level of significance, we only reject 
the null-hypothesis for two out of 79 parameters, while constancy is not rejected for 
any of the parameters at the 1% level. 
 
Overall, based on the suite of diagnostic tests we conclude that our threshold regres-
sion models appear well specified. 
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